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The outcome of the 7 April 2014 general election in Quebec proved to 
be a surprise to many observers. Voters across Quebec chose to support 
a pro-federalist, Liberal Party majority government, led by Philippe 
Couillard. Pauline Marois’s overtly separatist Parti Québecois (PQ) was 
soundly and unexpectedly defeated. The 33-day electoral campaign, 
marked by a heightened focus on Quebec independence, identity 
politics and the proposed extension of further protections for the French 
language, illustrated that Quebec society was far more concerned with 
issues surrounding the scope and delivery of healthcare, education 
and a whole host of related economic issues, including employment, 
provincial debt levels, public expenditures, taxation and the pace of 
economic growth. This essay, in examining the election campaign, 
suggests that the preferred message of the PQ failed to resonate with 
Quebec public opinion; a message that was only further muddled with 
the introduction of ‘star’ candidate Pierre Karl Péladeau. The results 
of the 2014 election, this essay concludes, further points to significant 
shifts underway in Quebec society; shifts that portend important new 
currents in public attitudes and the very relationship between the 
province’s residents and the Quebec state.
Introduction1
An unanticipated election result characterized by surprise, aston-
ishment and bewilderment. While this characterization might lead 
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one to think of the recent result of the Germany–Brazil World Cup 
semi-final football match (in which Germany thoroughly and unexpect-
edly dominated Brazil, 7–1), these words apply with equal candour 
and force to the results of the 7 April 2014 election in Quebec. The 
immediate electoral results are clear. The Liberal Party, under the 
leadership of Philippe Couillard, emerged victorious, capturing a clear 
parliamentary majority – 70 of the 125 seats in the Quebec National 
Assembly. The governing Parti Québecois (PQ) led by Premier and PQ 
leader Pauline Marois, was roundly defeated, capturing only 30 seats 
(from a pre-election total of 54). The Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) 
emerged in third place with 22 seats.
I will examine that election, and attempt to suggest what accounts 
for the unanticipated electoral result. I will also offer a word or two on 
developments in Quebec, above and beyond the specifics of the election 
itself, that may have indeed contributed to the outcome on 7 April. 
Finally, I will conclude with a very brief commentary on the state of 
political developments and economic challenges in Quebec.
The results
Official governance in Quebec is founded upon a quite familiar 
model – parliamentary democracy. The periodic election of individual 
members, representing competing political parties, to parliament (or in 
the case of Quebec, the National Assembly) based on a simple plurality 
of votes cast by registered individuals in carefully designated territori-
ally bound ridings, is the hallmark of Quebec and indeed many Western 
democracies. Quebec’s National Assembly, with 125 members, woke on 
the morning of 8 April to a profound shift in the political landscape of 
the province. The minority Parti Québécois, led by Pauline Marois (the 
first female Premier of Quebec) was resoundingly defeated. Madame 
Marois even lost her own riding of Charlevoix-Cote-de-Beaupre.2 The 
Liberal Party, under the direction of its leader, Philippe Couillard (who 
won his riding of Roberval, north of Quebec City in the Saguenay 
region), emerged triumphant with a solid majority of 70 seats.3 The 
Globe and Mail, Canada’s foremost newspaper, broadcast the electoral 
result in a full front-page spread. Two large, boldfaced words appeared 
above an oversized picture of a shocked Pauline Marois on election 
night: ‘PQ CRUSHED’.4 Montreal’s English-language newspaper, the 
Gazette, posted a banner of how each political party fared, photos of 
a jubilant Couillard and a disconsolate Marois, framed by a headline 
 The Quebec elecT ion of April  2014  89
broadcasting ‘COUILLARD’S LIBERALS IN, MAROIS OUT AS PQ 
LEADER’.5
Some of the most relevant statistical indicators to emerge from 
the election are as follows. The Liberals, who secured 70 seats, (up 
from 50 in the previous 2012 provincial election), captured 41.51 per 
cent of the popular vote. The PQ managed to win only 30 ridings (as 
compared to 54 in 2012), and perhaps more importantly, received 
only 25.38 per cent of Quebec’s popular vote, the smallest share of the 
popular vote that the PQ has received since 1970! The Coalition Avenir 
Québec, a right-of-centre party headed by former PQ member Francois 
Legault (a one-time member of the Marois-led PQ, who broke off from 
the party subsequently forming the CAQ), emerged with 22 seats (as 
compared to 19 in 2012) and 23.05 per cent of the popular vote. The 
left-of-centre Québec Solidaire ended the evening with three elected 
members, a net gain over its 2012 standing and 7.64 per cent of the 
popular vote. Voter turnout was 72 per cent of all eligible voters, as 
compared to 74.6 per cent in 2012. Most notable was the number of 
individuals who opted to vote in advance polls (as opposed to casting 
a ballot on election day) – more than 1.1 million Quebecers or 19.27 
per cent of eligible voters (up from 16.61 per cent in September 2012 
election) did so.6
The election
The election itself, which lasted some 33 days, began against a backdrop 
of decided confidence for the Parti Québécois; public opinion polls 
showed that the PQ held a 12–15 per cent lead amongst likely voters. 
The election, called by the PQ, was designed to deliver a majority 
government – albeit for the PQ, not the Liberals.
The PQ opened the campaign on 5 March focused on promoting 
two divisive policy platforms they had introduced while serving as 
a minority government: their pledge to extend French language 
protections by way of revision to the 1977 Quebec French Language 
Charter and the promotion of a new so-called Charter of Values. The 
centrepiece of this latter initiative was the call for a ban, ‘in the name 
of religious neutrality’, on wearing overt religious symbols ‘such as 
turbans, Islamic veils and Jewish kippahs by the 600,000 employees 
in Quebec’s public sector; in effect, from judges and prosecutors, to 
police and prison officers, civil servants, doctors, nurses, teachers, 
daycare workers and employees of government enterprises including 
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Loto-Quebec, Hydro-Quebec’ and the SAQ (the provincial-run wine and 
liquor distributor).7
The prospect of a PQ majority government would last for only 
four days. What would turn out to be the singular highlight and, most 
observers suggest, the critical tipping or turning point in the election, 
came on 9 March. The announcement that Pierre Karl Péladeau would 
stand as a candidate for the PQ in the riding of St-Jerome, was in 
itself a dramatic and decidedly unexpected development. A profound 
Quebec economic nationalist, the right-of-centre/anti-union leader 
of media giant Quebecor, seemed to many – including faithful PQ 
Members of the National Assembly (MNAs), political party members 
and long-time supporters – to be ill-suited to the progressive state-first 
orientation of the PQ. Yet, as confusing as this may have been to some, 
it was Mr Péladeau’s comments after being introduced by Mme Marois 
that would forever alter the campaign. He professed his ambition 
to ‘make Quebec a country’ and then with a clenched fist, forcefully 
punched the air.8
That moment, that statement, that gesture, irrevocably transformed 
the campaign: no longer would the focus be on identity and the Charter 
of Values, or revising the Quebec French Language Charter of 1977 
to further promote and expand the official presence and use of the 
French language in Quebec. Instead the election would now be squarely 
focused on the prospect of a third referendum and the ongoing quest 
of the PQ to secure political independence for Quebec. Péladeau’s 
recruitment and role in the electoral campaign guaranteed – especially 
to the delight of the Liberals – that the spectre of Quebec independence 
would remain at the centre of political discussion.
Marois and most of her closest advisers had concluded, even prior 
to the start of the election campaign, that if the PQ won a majority 
it would take at least a full mandate (four years) to prepare another 
referendum on sovereignty. She proposed to first begin by launching a 
province-wide consultation process with Quebecers and to then table 
a white paper on the future of Quebec, thereby initiating a debate.9 
All indications suggest that she may well have waited until the next 
election cycle had once again returned the PQ to power before placing 
a referendum before voters. Survey data confirmed that Péladeau was 
unquestionably a polarizing figure in Quebec, and worse yet for the PQ, 
the party quickly began to lose support to the Liberals and the CAQ, 
especially amongst francophone voters.
The Liberals led by Couillard, who as Liberal leader was regarded 
by many as a political neophyte to campaigning (and had only served 
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for three days as Liberal leader in the National Assembly), hammered 
away – successfully – at what he argued was the real agenda of the PQ. 
As journalist Sophie Cousineau observed: ‘Pierre Karl Péladeau was a 
dream come true for the Liberals’.10 Couillard’s most frequently used 
campaign phrase spoke volumes: ‘The best way not to have a referendum 
campaign is not to have a PQ government April 7’.11 It must be noted, 
however, that Couillard’s campaign was not risk-free; he ardently and 
repeatedly defended (in fact championed) bilingualism and federalism 
more fervently than any other political leader in provincial politics in 
many years.
Coalition Avenir Québec was, at the outset of the election campaign, 
considered by many as a distant third-place, fading party. The second 
televised debate between the political party leaders, however, changed 
that perception when a combative Francois Legault (a 56-year-old airline 
business executive) provided a strong performance that effectively 
placed his party back in the running as an electoral force. Indeed, 
towards the end of the campaign there was a thought that the CAQ 
might win enough seats to prevent the now surging Liberal Party from 
securing an outright majority (that turn of events never materialized).12 
The CAQ, like its ancestor, the Action démocratique du Québec (ADQ), 
is a conservative right-of-centre nationalist party that principally drew 
its support ‘from disaffected suburban and rural Liberals and a smaller 
swath from the PQ’.13 It did not win any of Montreal’s 28 ridings. Québec 
Solidaire won three seats, including Amir Khadir in Mercier, Francoise 
David (she first won in 2012 after three previous unsuccessful attempts) 
and Manon Masse (on her fifth attempt to win a seat in the National 
Assembly) in Saint-Marie-Saint-Jacques.14
Marois, who resigned in her concession speech (on a very 
awkward platform where the three signature candidates vying to follow 
her as leader of the party – Péladeau, Bernard Drainville and Jean-
François Lisée – all took turns aimed at implicitly projecting themselves 
as the front-runner for the leadership post), thanked her supporters by 
stating that ‘I’m worried about our language’.15 Péladeau declared, ‘In 
the 21st century Quebecers must start making their decisions alone’.16
In his remarks on the evening of 7 April, Couillard stated ‘the time 
of inflicting wounds is over … we are all Quebecers. We should focus 
on what brings us together. Division is over. Reconciliation begins’.17 
Here he was saying that discussion and debate over the PQ-sponsored 
Charter of Values, expanded Charter of the French Languages and 
political independence – all of which had proven, in the months prior 
to the election campaign and during the campaign itself to be decidedly 
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divisive, would be effectively curtailed and replaced with a more 
inclusive agenda, Quebec-focused within a broader Canadian federalist 
political structure.
As Les Perreaux of the Globe and Mail noted, the electoral results 
effectively ‘broke a cycle that has dominated Quebec politics since the 
1970s, when the PQ and Liberals started alternating their hold on 
power every eight or nine years’.18
For its part, Ottawa – and the ruling Conservative majority 
government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper – welcomed the election 
results. Having effectively stayed out of the campaign, Harper remarked 
that ‘the results clearly demonstrate that Quebecers have rejected the 
idea of a referendum and want a government that will be focused on 
the economy and job creation … we look forward to working with the 
new government of Quebec on these priorities’.19 Justin Trudeau, son 
of former Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau and leader of the federal 
Liberal Party (and Canada’s current Prime Minister) voiced that ‘I had 
the utmost confidence that Quebec voters would reject the negative, 
divisive politics of Mme. Marois’ proposed plan’.20
Interpreting the results
The pQ platform and the campaign itself
National columnist for the Globe and Mail, Jeffrey Simpson, observed 
that ‘when students of how not to run an election campaign turn to 
their textbooks, the PQ campaign of 2014 will be Chapter One’.21 
Péladeau’s entry into the provincial election as a ‘star’ candidate for 
the PQ, the subsequent fist clench, his statements and the spectre of 
another referendum were disastrous for the PQ’s electoral fortunes. 
Marois and the PQ were unprepared for the reaction caused by 
Péladeau’s call for independence. In short, his actions placed the PQ 
on the defensive for the rest of the campaign. The PQ election strategy 
hadn’t included or anticipated the need to discuss, let alone defend/
champion sovereignty or another referendum. Marois was forced to 
spend precious amounts of campaign time discussing ‘the nitty-gritty 
details of an independent Quebec, including hypothetical issues such 
as its currency and tourism policies’.22 The election became an ‘election 
on a referendum’.
Campaign gaffes also plagued the PQ campaign. On 13 March, just 
four days after Péladeau was introduced to Quebec voters, a reporter 
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asked him a question. Yet when Péladeau. who was standing behind 
Marois at a news conference, chose to step forward to the platform to 
respond, Marois gently pushed him aside and instead responded to the 
enquiry herself. Other examples include:
• In the midst of the campaign, Marois (who was confident that the 
proposed Charter respected the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms) surprised Quebecers when she announced that a newly 
elected PQ government ‘would override any legal challenge’ by 
utilizing the Canadian Constitution’s notwithstanding clause.23
• Evelyne Abitbol, a candidate for the PQ in Acadie, finished a 
remote second – she suggested during the campaign, which caused 
controversy, ‘that under the PQ’s proposed Charter of Values, that 
any Jewish doctor who refused to remove his kippah would be 
fired’.24
• Teacher and PQ candidate Louise Mailloux, who compared circum-
cision and baptism to rape and said kosher products were a scam 
designed to allow Rabbis to line their pockets and fund what she 
called ‘religious wars’, lost her bid to become an MNA.25
Surprisingly, the PQ campaign strategy did not call for or include 
plans for an orchestrated attack against Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper’s federal Conservatives (always a prominent feature in Quebec 
in an effort to build support for, and associated with the run-up to, a 
referendum).26
The charter of Values
There was never uniform support for this initiative, amongst Quebecers, 
amongst francophones and within the PQ itself.27 A proposed ban on 
wearing religious signs – an essential contradiction of the Canadian 
Charter and case law in Canada – was met with significant high-profile 
opposition. Montreal Mayor Denis Coderre, universities, hospitals, 
school boards, Quebec’s human rights commission, the Quebec Bar 
Association and past PQ premiers Jacques Parizeau, Lucien Bouchard 
and Bernard Landry (and former BQ leader Gilles Duceppe) all 
denounced the initiative.28 This made it difficult for the PQ to 
galvanize support amongst Quebecers for this proposed action during 
the campaign. Secular-oriented sovereigntists who opposed the Charter 
and were unable to accept a right-of-centre pro-business/anti-union 
figure such as Péladeau were driven to support left-of-centre Québec 
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Solidaire. Conservative nationalists were also attracted by Legault’s 
CAQ.29
Poll after poll uniformly demonstrated that Quebecers were not 
foremost interested and did not support the PQ campaign of identity 
politics as an issue deserving priority; instead, their concern was with 
jobs and economic growth. The need for new job growth (Quebec had 
actually lost nearly 30,000 jobs in February 2014 alone), efforts to 
address health care issues and the burgeoning debt were the concerns 
that preoccupied Quebecers.30
The liberals
The Liberals immediately, consistently and forcefully seized on 
Péladeau’s truthfulness and blatantly warned that a referendum (and 
the ongoing PQ quest for Quebec political independence) would/must 
follow any PQ victory. Everywhere he travelled in Quebec, party leader 
Philippe Couillard reminded voters of this elementary fact. The Liberal 
campaign was invigorated as a result.
As a campaigner, Couillard did a superior job, proved to be a 
tireless worker and canvassed the province. The grassroots-focused 
campaign run by the Quebec Liberal Party was excellent. It must be 
acknowledged that Liberal leader Couillard made a few missteps 
during the race, the most notable being his comment during the second 
leaders’ debate when he suggested that factory-floor employees at 
Quebec manufacturers who might come into contact with English-
speaking clients should be bilingual. Couillard, later corrected himself 
saying he was referring to employees in customer service who 
would regularly interact with English-speaking customers and business 
leaders/colleagues.31
Future directions in Quebec – A final word?
The April 2014 election campaign and result suggest two larger obser-
vations on Quebec society. First, additional administrative or legislative 
efforts aimed at advancing protections for the French language in 
the province are simply not as salient – they matter far less to the 
residents of Quebec in 2014 – as they once were. Simply put, 40 years 
of combined provincial and federal legislation and corresponding public 
policies have worked, in large measure (albeit not completely), to 
effectively defuse the lethal toxicity associated with language issues in 
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Quebec. Second, Philippe Couillard’s victory provides further evidence 
that the social and political landscape of Quebec has been and continues 
to undergo a very significant shift; in short, the tectonic plates under-
pinning Quebec’s model of development launched during the Quiet 
Revolution of the 1960s – in which the state’s institutional machinery 
was geared towards providing an expansive range of significant social 
and economic benefits – are shifting dramatically. The relationship 
between the Quebec government and its people is being fundamentally 
redefined; the prevailing state-centric model appears on its way to being 
displaced.
In the wake of the election, the current political landscape in 
Quebec leaves the Parti Québecois in search of answers to three related 
questions: who will lead the party (Marois was initially succeeded 
by Pierre Karl Péladeau who subsequently resigned from political 
life; Jean-François Lisée currently serves as party leader), how will 
the PQ recapture political power as a majority government, and 
more profoundly, can it find a way to make political independence 
an attractive option for Quebecers in the twenty-first century? Make 
no mistake, the desire for sovereignty in Quebec is not extinguished. 
Upwards of a third of Quebecers, polls demonstrate, want a country, 
rain or shine.
As Quebec’s 31st Premier – along with his eight women, 18 men, 
26-member cabinet – Premier Couillard has his work cut out for him; 
most especially on the economic front. To reposition Quebec as a place 
of economic growth, new jobs, lower taxes, receptive to international 
business and committed to lowering the debt level, the government 
has above all else committed itself to restraining, indeed reducing, 
public expenditures. A mini budget was recently unveiled, with the first 
comprehensive budget set to be introduced in autumn 2014.
What are the prospects for success? The Premier has placed 
enormously talented individuals as MNAs in charge of finance (Carlos 
Leitao, former Laurentian Bank of Canada chief economist) and the 
Treasury Board (economist Martin Coiteux, Quebec representative to 
the Bank of Canada). Perhaps more importantly, there exists a widely 
acknowledged acceptance on the part of Quebecers that action – now, 
not later – must be taken to remedy Quebec’s economic future.32
The Quebec election of April 2014 ushered in a new political 
reality: Premier Couillard’s central concern, in the short-term, will not 
be opposition from the independence-minded Parti Québecois, but will 
instead lie in the many economic challenges Quebec must squarely 
face.
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